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Introduction 
The Policy Studies literature on ‘policy entrepreneurs’ has focused on individuals operating 
in national, or sub-national, policy settings.  Analyses have looked at the characteristics of these 
individuals as sometimes charismatic and ‘authoritative leaders’ or ‘knowledge brokers’ or 
‘political mavericks’.  Consequently, the policy entrepreneur can appear too “heroic” (Nay, 2012).  
This paper conceptually stretches the idea of ‘policy entrepreneur’ to consider on the one hand, the 
organizational dimensions of this phenomenon and, on the other hand, the international domains of 
policy deliberation where policy entrepreneurs are increasingly active. The paper argues that while 
individual transnational policy entrepreneurs exist, their entrepreneurship in the cultivation of 
transnational influence is better understood by focusing on their organizational context and 
networking inside international policy communities. 
 
 The paper is organized around two themes. The first conceptual theme concentrates on the 
‘policy entrepreneur’ concept developed by John Kingdon (1995) in the ‘multiple streams’ theory of 
the policy process. The conceptual innovation is to advance the idea of policy entrepreneurship as 
an organizational capacity rather than one vested solely in individuals. The second empirical theme 
takes as a primary illustration of transnational policy entrepreneurship the case of the International 
Crisis Group (hereafter ICG or Crisis Group). While there are other entrepreneurial non-
governmental organizations (NGO), Crisis Group makes a good case because: a) it was established 
as an analytic and advocacy organization and thereby has to make its case via the power of persuasion 
to shape policy rather than on any material incentive or authority basis; b) Crisis Group is 
transnational in its operations, its organization and political connections, as well as the international 
policy communities where it targets its analysis and advocacy; c) in its  quarter century history it has 
received a remarkable degree of political acclamation; and d) as a media information body it has 
readily accessible files.  
 
International Crisis Group was established in 1995 as an advocacy organization committed 
to preventing and resolving deadly conflict working primarily through “field-based analysis, 
practical policy prescriptions and high-level advocacy” (ICG 2013). By 2010, Crisis Group had 
obtained official accreditation as an international development organization from the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). Focusing on organizational policy entrepreneurialism of ICG, this paper does not address 
the causes of conflict or mechanics of ‘crisis intelligence gathering’. Instead, the concern is to 
identify factors that facilitate or obstruct individual and organizational ‘policy entrepreneurs’.  
 
As individuals, policy entrepreneurs wield power through personal connections and their 
persuasive policy proposals, but this power can be enhanced by organizational resources and 
strategic networking. Organizations are essential to the longevity of policy campaigns, combating 
communication problems and sustaining transnational activism. That is, “it is the interactions 
among several types of individuals and organizations that might be of greater importance” (Rosen 
and Olsson, 2015: 201).  ICG has been highly effective to the extent that it is sometimes regarded 
as a ‘new diplomat’ (interview 1).  
 
While ICG presents as non-governmental, its key personnel are characterized by an 
“overwhelming presence of (former) politicians and diplomats” to such an extent as to be “near-
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governmental” (Oberg, 2005). Herein lies a key distinction of policy entrepreneur to that of the 
‘transnational advocacy network’ (TAN) actor. Policy entrepreneurs are ‘insiders’ to international 
policy communities. By contrast, the TAN literature is mostly concerned with outsiders, norm 
promotion and the campaigns of ‘alternative policy groups’ (Carroll, 2015) hence its central concept 
of the ‘boomerang effect’. In cases where “the channels between the state and its domestic actors 
are blocked, the boomerang pattern of influence characteristic of transnational networks may occur: 
domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure 
on their states from outside” (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 13). 
 
After first extending the Multiple Streams approach to transnational domains, the discussion 
draws upon the policy entrepreneur tool-kit developed by another transnational actor – the Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI). Using the theories of John Kingdon, ODI outlined distinct 
entrepreneur styles and techniques that both individuals and organizations cultivate and deploy in 
global policy processes. However, the problem definition and agenda-setting powers of policy 
entrepreneurs is constrained by several ‘communication paradoxes’. These are outlined and related 
to ICG in the second half of the paper.  
 
Policy Entrepreneurs 
The phrase of ‘policy entrepreneur’ has entered the popular lexicon. However, there is 
relatively little conceptualization on such creatures (see the meta-review by Jones et al, 2016 and 
for an exception, see Arieli and Cohen, 2013: 240-43). The policy entrepreneur idea has yet to be 
systematically integrated with theories of policy change (Mintrom and Norman, 2009: 650). This 
has been compounded by the extrapolation of the idea of ‘policy entrepreneur’ from broader 
theorizing on the policy process.  Even in the Multiple Streams (MS) approach of John Kingdon, 
the policy entrepreneur idea is considered to be one of the least developed components in the 
literature (Jones, et al, 2016). 
 
In cross disciplinary terms, the policy entrepreneur concept is cognate with but often 
unconnected to notions of ‘norm entrepreneurship’ in International Relations and Peace Studies 
(see inter alia Thakur and Weiss 2009, Wexler, 2003) on the one hand,  and on the other, to ‘social 
entrepreneur’ concepts in both Business Studies and Third Sector Studies (inter alia, Bouteligier 
2011; Desa 2012; Zhu 2008). Further disciplinary disjuncture occurs with social policy ideas of 
‘policy flexians’ (Stubbs, 2013; Kostić, 2014) and organization theory developments around ‘issue 
professionals’ (Henrikson and Seabrooke, 2015). There is a degree of ‘epistemic rivalry’ among 
different concepts across disciplines (Shwed and Bearman, 2010: 818).  
 
A core concept in Policy Studies, ‘policy entrepreneurs’ are generally defined as proactive 
‘change agents’ in policy formulation and decision making.  They have been described as 
individuals:  
“…who exploit opportunities to influence policy outcomes to maximize self-interest—
without having the necessary resources required for achieving this goal alone. They are 
not satisfied by merely increasing their self-interest within given institutions or 
constraints that others have established. Rather, they try to influence a given public 
policy in order to open up new horizons of opportunities” (Arieli and Cohen, 2013: 238). 
Policy entrepreneurs can sometimes be found outside the formal institutions of governance, quite 
often in a NGO, a political party or a university. Yet, the policy entrepreneur is more likely to be 
working within the architecture of the state, sometimes behind-the-scenes and not necessarily 
seeking to be engaged with public discourse. They target decision making elites in government or 
the key players and interests in policy communities and political parties. They gravitate to, and 
oscillate around centres of power.   
 
The policy entrepreneur idea sometimes approximates the ‘great man’ theory of history. 
There is a tendency towards methodological individualism with the focus on a charismatic individual 
or persuasive policy leader. While this focus is important for highlighting agency, it is important to 
recognize the limits of agency centered explanation: “Just as entrepreneurs cannot be blamed or 
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credited for all changes that occur in the business realm, we should not assume that policy change is 
always and everywhere driven by policy entrepreneurship” (Mintrom and Norman, 2009: 650). 
Studies that take the motivations of an individual policy entrepreneur as the dominant forces guiding 
policy can overstate the coherence and unity of purpose that policy entrepreneurs may give to an 
organisation. The reality is more complicated when delving into the organisational ‘black box’. One 
occupant of an official position may use his/her position to promote new policy agendas, but other 
occupants may be more conservative in approach (Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2012) simply 
enacting their roles. This makes MS approach of agenda-setting useful for it embeds the policy 
entrepreneur phenomenon in broader policy and political dynamics (Jones, et al, 2016). The policy 
entrepreneur idea could also be complemented with institutional theory (Bakir, 2009) policy network 
concepts (Huitema and Meijerink, 2010), organization theory (Desa, 2012; Henriksen and 
Seabrooke, 2016) and political economy (Mukhtarov and Gerlak, 2013) – but this would be the task 
of another paper.  
 
Transnational Multiple Streams 
The Multiple Streams model of the policy process emerges from the ‘garbage can model’ in 
organization theory (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972).  Instead of a large organization in which 
people make decisions on the basis of solutions chasing problems, Kingdon portrayed the American 
political system as an organization writ large.  Decision making consists of the coordination and 
confluence of three relatively independent “streams”: problems, politics and policies. The 
individual streams each possess a unique dynamic but are not completely independent from each 
other. When these streams couple, a ‘policy window’ opens which may facilitate policy change. A 
significant amount of work has been done to tailor and adapt the framework to the European Union 
context (Akrill and Kay, 2011; and especially Herweg, 2015). This paper takes a further step to 
consider policy entrepreneurs in transnational streams of policy, politics and problems.  
 
First, the problem stream is composed of evidence of the nature of a problem that results 
from crises, focusing events, institutional feedback and indicators that bring to attention public 
problems. Indicators can illuminate the scope and severity of a problem via monitoring of natural 
(or social) processes, activities and events over time. For example, the Keeling Curve – the decades-
long study since the 1950s monitoring of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) levels – is one indicator 
that came to political attention in the 1990s (Pralle, 2009). By contrast, dramatic focusing events 
grab the attention of both the public and policymakers. They are relatively rare sudden events (such 
as natural disasters) that cause great damage, or international conflicts and civil wars that foretell 
of greater future damage. Generally, such events are concentrated to a particular geographical area 
or community of interest. Finally, policymakers can become aware of problems through feedback 
on existing policy. Often this is negative feedback generated by evaluation studies or advocacy 
groups as well as by bureaucrats or policymakers themselves, who report on what is not working or 
on the unintended consequences of policies (Pralle, 2009: 784-85).  Usually understood within a 
national or local context, without doubt many problem streams (emerging from pollution, 
pandemics and civil conflict) are now of a cross border character (see also Arieli and Cohen, 2013; 
Faling et al, 2018).  
 
Second, the policy stream represents various attempts to provide solutions to one or more 
public problems. That is, proposals for new policies or amendments of existing policies as well as 
deliberative processes for eliminating policies that are normatively and pragmatically unviable and 
often subject to elite pressures of a narrow policy community. Specialized participants – official 
actors such as civil servants and diplomats but also ‘insiders’ such as selected think tankers, 
academics and interest group officials – champion specific policy proposals that may be applied to 
a variety of public problems. “They try out their ideas on each other by going to lunch, circulating 
papers, publishing articles, holding hearings, presenting testimony, and drafting and pushing 
legislative proposals” in this policy “primeval soup” (Kingdon, 1995: 122-23). Solutions chase 
problems in the sense that policy entrepreneurs push their ‘pet proposals’. For example, seeking to 
overturn the current policy hegemony of drug control and criminalization, ‘harm reduction’ is the 
solution promoted by the privately initiated Global Drug Commission (Alimi 2015).  
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In global and regional governance, policy streams intersect not only government agencies 
but also international organizations, global commissions, treaty structures as well as numerous 
global public-private partnerships. The venues are geographically dispersed between the 
conferences, international organization headquarters (Paris, Geneva, Tokyo, Washington DC., etc) 
and other locales pertinent to a policy concern. Transnational policy streams are often diverse and 
dynamic with a constant turnover of representatives from government agencies and international 
organizations as well as expert actors from think tanks, universities, consultancy firms and scientific 
bodies.  For instance, campaigns like the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (Wexler, 2003), 
transnational campaigning against the trade in toxic waste (Smith, 1999) as well as social movement 
activism such as in women’s rights (Jutta, 2003). In transnational environments, the primeval ‘soup’ 
is in a much larger tureen, or ecology, of policy actors than at the national level.  
 
Third, the politics stream flows and ebbs on ideological and institutional characteristics of 
governance. The ‘politics’ stream accounts for changes in ‘the national mood’ or ‘global opinion’, 
the influence of public campaigns of interest groups, ‘administrative or legislative turnovers’ and 
changes of allegiances of politicians within parliaments. Changes can enable or disable the advance 
of proposals to the political agenda. Elections bring new participants into the policy process and 
provide deadlines for policy choices. Adapting this idea to transnational domains (where electoral 
dynamics are not apparent, and global government entirely absent), the politics stream is manifest 
in international summitry, such as G20 meetings and UN conferences. International agendas 
concerning the Millennium (now Sustainable) Development Goals (MDGs) or ‘global public 
goods’ (GPGs) delivery also establish the boundaries of international policy communities. 
 
‘Policy windows’ may open temporarily when the streams overlap or ‘couple’ and facilitate 
the adoption of a particular proposal to the agenda (Kingdon, 1995, 87). Windows are particular 
moments in time (for instance an election or disaster but also windows kept open for longer periods 
by on-going war and conflict) that offer the moment for policy entrepreneurs to launch and gain 
support for new policy proposals. The temporal character of windows must be recognized and 
exploited so that entrepreneurs can promote their ideas and form a new policy consensus around 
their evidence (Shwed and Bearman, 2010) . The combination and coupling of the different streams 
cannot be predicted in advance; it is highly dependent on the context. The number of decisions, the 
routes of access to decision venues, the overall organizational load of problems or the degree of 
energy and attention across these venues form part of this context and influence the likelihood of 
the coupling of the streams. Entrepreneurship is conditioned by the institutional frameworks in 
which actors try to promote their pet ideas. Policy ideas are only likely to be selected from the 
‘primeval soup’ if they are also ‘technically feasible’ and have ‘value acceptability’, referred to 
elsewhere as non-contestability of a scientific consensus (Schwed and Bearman, 2010). 
 
Technical feasibility consists of administrative, financial, legal and technological factors that 
impinge on viability of a proposal. In the policy stream, advocates of proposals gradually eliminate 
inconsistencies, develop policy instruments and practical blueprints to enhance the technical 
feasibility of their proposals. ‘Value acceptability’ refers to proposals being concordant with 
political culture, the ‘national mood’, and prevailing ideological positions about the size of 
government, equity or efficiency (Zhu, 2008: 317). Whilst ‘national mood’ is a difficult concept to 
pin down, the idea of ‘global opinion’ is even more so but is nevertheless something that emerges 
from time to time following the campaigns of social movements and/or initiatives of international 
organizations and NGOs (see for example, Wong, 2012). As discussed later, Crisis Group takes 
pride in its organizational capacity for international consciousness-raising (interview 2).   
 
In sum, a national political system or transnational policy domain has a tendency to create 
new policy or initiate significant reform when these independent streams flow together. This 
convergence requires a concurrence of random events or the emergence of a policy entrepreneur 
(itself a random event) who work to couple the streams. Policy entrepreneurs operate in these 
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‘organized anarchies’; a term that very much approximates the realities of transnational policy 
making with its maze of global and regional organizations and initiatives.   
 
Policy Entrepreneurs  
In the original MS formulation, “there is both a functional and physical separation of policy 
entrepreneurs and decision-makers” (Akrill and Kay 2011: 74). Much work since has modified this 
strict separation recognising that entrepreneurs may not only supply and sell ideas to decision-
makers, but can be involved directly in the formulation of policy. Likewise, members of parliament 
or congress in the politics stream, may act as policy entrepreneurs on certain issues (Carter and Scott, 
2009).  
 
The policy entrepreneur concept is similar to the new notions of both ‘issue professional’ 
(Henriksen and Seabrooke, 2016) and ‘policy flexian’ (Stubbs, 2013; Kostić, 2014). Both focus on 
the capacities and self-interested motivations of individuals. The former stresses the expert and 
professional commitment to an issue or problem of an actor rather than to an organisation or 
professional body. The latter connects to theories of an international power elite where political 
operators move among prominent roles in government, business, think tanks, and media. Examples 
are said to include the financier and philanthropist George Soros or Larry Summers, former US 
Treasury Secretary and ex-President of Harvard University.  With both concepts, individuals “are 
promiscuous as they seek to maximize issue control within their professional and organizational 
networks” (Henriksen and Seabrooke, 2016: 723).  
 
Although in general, they do not occupy  formal political office, policy entrepreneurs often 
retain significant resources. Such resources can be a mix of epistemic authority (such as that held by 
economists), former government service or policy experience in the field.  
“The first resource is claim to a hearing, which means that an actor has an ability to 
speak for others, hold a decision making position or possesses expertise. The second 
resource regards political connections or negotiating skills, implying a combination of 
technical expertise and political know-how. The third, and by Kingdon labelled the most 
important resource, is sheer persistence. This means that actors promote their ideas in 
all ways and in several fora, and are willing to invest large resources in order to promote 
their solutions” (Gulbrandsson and Fossum, 2009: 435).   
The entrepreneur is someone proactively engaged in ‘coupling’ the streams consistently over time, 
and often in the face of opposition or disinterest. They “do more than push for their proposal – they 
lie in wait” (Kingdon, 1995: 181). While the opening of a ‘window of opportunity’ may be sudden 
or unexpected, nevertheless, the policy entrepreneur has been formulating and refining their policy 
proposal for many years (also Arieli and Cohen, 2013: 241-43).  
 
Policy entrepreneurs spend much time convincing other actors involved in the policy-making 
process of their ideas and by persuading opponents to rethink their position. “It is the embedded-ness 
of involved actors into the structure of a policy network that supports policy entrepreneurs in reaching 
these goals” (Braun 2009). ‘Embedded-ness’ is intangible but results from an individual’s acceptance 
into policy communities where participants build and establish their personal reputation and 
credibility, contribute to the construction of consensual policy knowledge, build alliances, and share 
discourses to shape the terms of debate. The policy entrepreneur is a participant in these 
(international) policy communities (Rosen and Olsen, 2015; Stone 2013).  
 
Policy entrepreneurship takes many diverse forms.  It rests on a strategic blend of ‘softening-
up’ actors in the political and policy stream through use of personal contacts, networking, media 
strategies and the creation of powerful policy narratives that simplify complex issues into 
manageable items of public policy. It is the management and communication of expert discourse 
rather than the data, evidence or research findings per se that empowers the entrepreneur in agenda 
setting. Although important, scientific credibility and intellectual authority is not the only 
consideration. Political sophistication is also essential. Consequently, in reality, entrepreneurship can 
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be quixotic, intangible and reflective of adaptive and sometimes unorthodox practices of ‘bricolage’ 
(Desa, 2012). 
 
The individual policy entrepreneur can be from any number of professions and backgrounds. 
She or he can be an expert with epistemic resources at hand; they can be highly experienced 
practitioners with a gift for communication in pitching proposals in a manner that is not only 
congruent with reigning values but that is also technically feasible.  In the existing literature, policy 
entrepreneurs include a ‘celebrated surgeon’ Professor Sir Ara Darzi who influenced the London 
Health Review (Oborn, Barrett and Exworthy, 2011); the Australian economist Professor Ross 
Garnaut who heralded a significant policy shift in Australia’s economic relations and trade in the 
Asia-Pacific (Beeson and Stone, 2013); and a World Bank economist returning to Turkey, Kemal 
Dervis’ who played a pivotal role in that country’s central bank reform (Bakir, 2009: 588).   
 
Rather than a single person, teams of entrepreneurs have also been identified such as a group 
of individual water managers in transition contexts (Huitema and Meijerink, 2010); a mixed group 
of private sector, third sector and public administration entrepreneurs in the post conflict scenario of 
Israel and Jordan (Arieli and Cohen, 2013) and a group of Chinese local government officials in 
housing modernization (Zhu, 2013). Despite these qualities of connectedness, personal appeal and 
dogged determination, individual policy entrepreneurs, or teams of them, may prove ineffective 
without organizational support to advance their solutions into the international ‘political arena’. 
Without this support from the rest of the organisational iceberg, ‘sheer persistence’ may lead to burn-
out for individuals and/or limited agenda-setting impact. Accordingly, this paper highlights the 
organisational dimensions behind policy entrepreneurialism needed to connect to transnational 
political streams.  
 
International Crisis Group is noted for its ‘sheer persistence’ on conflict issues. It has 
achieved remarkable success as an international NGO. Some call it a think tank (Grigat, 2014 and 
Kostić, 2014), a label rejected by a former ICG President, (Evans, 2017: 215; interviews 2 and 3). 
Already, ICG’s reputation has merited a special edition in July 2014 of the journal Third World 
Quarterly where ICG was cast as the “paramount example of a highly visible, vocal, hard-to-ignore 
conflict expert” (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2014a: 546). World leaders have lined up to support the 
Group; former UN Secretary General Kofi Anan referred to the Group as “a global voice of 
conscience” (quoted in Duffield, 2007: 8). Crisis Group acts as a policy entrepreneur with its 
“conflict analysis”, “expert field research” and “practical, imaginative policy prescriptions” (ICG, 
2015).  The source of Crisis Group’s power rests not simply on NGO independence combined with 
field experience and expertise. ICG power and influence is also built on close connections to multiple 
centers of political power and financing alongside sophisticated communication strategies. 
 
A Short History of Crisis Group 
The crisis in Bosnia was the catalyst for the formation of International Crisis Group.  In 
1993, Morton Abramowitz (then President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and 
former US Ambassador to Turkey and Thailand), and Mark Malloch Brown (former head of the 
United Nations Development Programme – UNDP, the UN Deputy Secretary-General and UK 
Minister) discussed the initial idea of the ICG on a plane, from the war in Sarajevo (ICG, 2010: 28). 
An organization like Crisis Group was needed, in their view, because the international community 
was not responding effectively to international crises. Morton Abramowitz states that in the 
beginning he was uncertain of the future of ICG and he worried the organization would not receive 
the funds required. However, the billionaire philanthropist George Soros helped launch the ICG with 
a large grant. A former US Congressman, Stephen Solarz, gathered funds from Finland through the 
Nobel prize winner diplomat and politician Martti Ahtisaari and from Australia through the Foreign 
Minister Gareth Evans (ICG 2010: 7-13; Evans, 2017: 206-07). In rough figures, around 40% of the 
budget continues to come from mostly western governments, and another 40% from philanthropic 
foundations (see Oberg 2005).   
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In its first advocacy effort, in 1996 the ICG alerted the UN Security Council on the crisis in 
Burundi (ICG 2010, 28). In addition, Crisis Group organized experts report on Why the Bosnia 
Elections Must be Postponed which was picked up extensively by the international media writing on 
Western government inaction towards Bosnia (ICG 2010, 18). Thereafter, ICG development was 
rapid. In only a few years, the organization went from 3 staff to 25 (ICG 2010, 9).  In 1997 the ICG 
started its research and advocacy in Central Africa, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania, and the 
following two years in Cambodia and Algeria. 1998 saw the Kosovo Spring report published which 
was widely cited and raised awareness of the looming crisis.    
 
ICG also came into some difficult circumstances in the late 1990s when a number of key 
founding figures departed or died. Funding plateaued at around $2-3 million per annum. However, 
the year 2000 was seen as a “new era” when Gareth Evans (former Australian Foreign Minister) 
stepped up as Ppresident, and from Finland, Martti Ahtisaari became chairman (ICG 2010, 23). A 
second grant from Soros, of US$2.5 million, allowed the organization to grow and open offices in 
New York and Paris. Operations were established in West Africa, Southern Africa, Central Asia, 
South East Asia and the Andes (ICG 2010, 23). By 2012, with an annual budget of US$20.5 million, 
ICG employed over 130 permanent staff (many of them journalists), it published over 90 reports and 
briefing papers annually as well as monthly CrisisWatch bulletins. ICG work is grounded in field 
research across conflict countries, and then feeds this information back to political decision makers,.  
 
The founding actors in ICG – Abromowitz, Ahtisari, Evans, Malloch-Brown and Solarz – 
are seen as policy entrepreneurs within ICG (interviews 1 and 2). Elsewhere, Soros has been 
described (and decried) as a transnational policy entrepreneur. On the stage of world affairs, however, 
an organization was needed as a vehicle to connect these individuals into a stronger web of activity.  
The way the organization developed, its so-called ‘methodology’, saw the Group become an 
organizational policy entrepreneur. 
 
Entrepreneurial Strategies 
If policy entrepreneurs (help) shape policy agendas, then many organisations have a vested 
interest in cultivating them. Applied work on policy entrepreneurship has been led by RAPID 
(Research and Policy in Development), a unit based inside one of Britain’s oldest and largest think 
tanks, the Overseas Development Institute.  The RAPID team identified four different types of policy 
entrepreneur: 
1. The story teller 
2. The engineer 
3. The networker 
4. The fixer 
RAPID’s work emerged from the frustrations of ODI staff that their policy recommendations were 
being ignored in the policy process (Stone 2013).  The thinking behind the RAPID typology was that 
it was a faulty assumption that experts have the epistemic authority to ‘Speak Truth to Power’. 
Instead, the power to set agendas is a ‘battlefield of ideas’.  
 
The first style is that of the ‘story teller’ who exhibits discursive power. This is someone 
who has the ‘gift of the gab’ and is able to translate complex ideas or complicated data into powerful 
narratives to inform policy communities.  The (post) ‘Washington Consensus’ or ‘debt-relief’ as 
poverty-reduction solutions are powerful ‘short-hand’ stories which help the research community to 
explain to policy-makers what the problem is and what the solution might be. Likewise, the acronym 
‘R2P’ has become a recognisable signifier in transnational policy communities within which ICG 
circulates regarding ‘responsibility to protect’ (Thakur and Weiss, 2009). Stories are particularly 
important for creating ‘value acceptability’ and in this regard Crisis Group’s journalists ‘in the field’ 
have excelled in attracting media coverage. 
 
 The second style reflects the power of personal and political connections. The ‘networker’ 
is someone who not only knows relevant players, and who has informal or official entré into the 
offices of power-holders but is also someone who knows how to mobilize such networks.  At an 
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organizational level, Boards are crucial in this policy entrepreneurship role, and Crisis group is no 
exception (interview 1).  Morton Abramowitz notes that the “ICG has been blessed with its Board 
and its chairmen … who gave the organization a credibility it had not yet earned” (ICG 2010, 7).  
Crisis Group has invested heavily in ‘anticipatory relationships’ with both political elites and 
‘outsiders’ in order to embed the organization in what they call ‘framework diplomacy’ (2016: 43-
45).  
 
 The third style is a capacity for political strategizing and scheming. The ‘fixer’ is a 
Machiavellian figure in the RAPID typology. A more positive image is to recognize the “social 
acuity” of entrepreneurs (Mintrom and Norman, 2009). Such individuals are well versed the informal 
dynamics of policy, knowing personalities, political intrigues and how to best pitch their cause in 
circumstances of political chaos or policy uncertainty. Former politicians (such as those in the ‘star 
studded’ membership of the ICG Board) are often well versed in such skills and the arts of persuasion 
where “influence was often behind the scenes” (interview 1).   
 
The fourth style arises from the technical prowess or weight of professional experience of 
the ‘ engineer’. This is another metaphorical figure who engages with policy on the ground and with 
‘street level bureaucrats’.  Where the previous styles emphasize links to power, and especially agenda 
setting capacities at the earlier stages of policy making, this last category connects more substantially 
to developing templates for the technical feasibility of proposals or imaginative solutions and 
procedures of implementation. This is a different species of policy entrepreneur from the ICG Board 
Member but ICG field offices are a key component of ICG methodology with “considerable 
autonomy” to be “creative” (interview 1) and in generating practical policy recommendations 
(Bliesemann de Guevara, 2014b).  
 
RAPID was directly concerned with up-scaling think tank organizational capacities by 
creating a policy entrepreneur ‘tool-kit’.  The Institute and ODI’s funders desired heightened impact 
within policy making venues nationally and internationally. Yet, mainstreaming the toolkit into 
ODI’s operations brought some cautionary tales revealing the limitations of policy entrepreneurship. 
These lessons were called ‘communication paradoxes’. They are counter-factual points that highlight 
the difficulties for any international body seeking to build value acceptability in global or regional 
affairs: 
1. The complexity paradox says that the simple stories needed for communication can 
obscure complexity in the real world. Interestingly, ICG web-site keeps its messages 
simple whereas the historical and political complexities of the causes of specific wars 
and conflicts are documented in the more technical reports.  
2. The altruism paradox suggests that compassion may be most at risk just when it is 
most needed. For instance, people lose sight of inter-generational justice, the plight of 
refugees or commitment to R2P when confronted by immediate costs and public sector 
cuts at national level that have immediate bearing on their daily existence.  
3. The attachment paradox says that public support for peace and/or development 
depends on existing links and relationships, but these may cause mis‐direction of 
resources. A good example is ‘aid for trade’ where development assistance is 
expended in low-middle income developing countries that are trade partners with the 
donor country, rather than with poor countries or fragile states elsewhere.  
4. The pooling paradox says that multilateral action and donor pooling of resources may 
be efficient, but that the public likes to see a flag attached to their development 
assistance or humanitarian intervention, and also to see direct results in return for their 
tax spend. ICG is globalist in orientation which can make it appear elite and distant to 
populist publics.  
5. The paradox of ambition says that unachievable targets may be necessary to fire up 
public enthusiasm. This has been said of the MDGs but applies equally to the Kyoto 
Protocol timetable and targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. ICG mission of 
“preventing and resolving deadly conflict” falls into this paradox (Oberg, 2005). 
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To these constraining factors, another two on technical feasibility and epistemic credibility can be 
added alongside another on the public interest: 
6. The paradox of wicked problems suggests that “the public is also less likely to worry 
about problems when they feel there is nothing to be done about them” (Pralle, 2009: 
786). For example, for climate change or slow burning conflict zones to stay high on 
political agendas, the public and policymakers must be certain not only that something 
must be done, but that it can be done. 
7. The paradox of scientific consensus is that while scientific communities can 
comprehend the nuance of uncertainty, the public are less likely to be concerned about 
an issue when consensus is lacking, or data is highly contested (Pralle, 2009: 787). 
The cause of, and solution to, conflict are highly contested.  
8. The paradox of public action is that organisational imperatives for growth or 
(financial) sustainability are first priority. A criticism of peace advocacy projects is 
that they promote ‘solutions’ that do not address underlying causes of conflict but 
sustain conditions for the continued existence of the advocacy organisation (Sending, 
2019).  
These paradoxes (which differ in potency according to specific issues) indicate that the policy 
entrepreneur is bound inextricably by socio-economic and political constraints and conditioned by 
the institutional frameworks in which actors try to promote their pet ideas. One person alone cannot 
contain all these paradoxes all the time. For issues to remain on the agenda, rather than wax and 
wane, these paradoxes need to be confronted strategically and carefully manipulated over the longer 
term through organizations and their networks. 
 
In of case studies of individuals there is a tendency to over-state the role of agency and push 
analysis too far in the direction of methodological individualism; “attention is drawn to the official 
policy entrepreneur such as chief executives, or other prominent politicians… (when) in reality there 
may be several people working together in the policy process” (Oborn, Barrett and Exworthy, 2011: 
328). The key explanatory factor may not be the role of individual agents but may be found elsewhere 
in “a temporal conjunction of separate sub-policy processes: ‘agenda setting, alternative–
specification, and decision making’” (Akrill and Kay, 2011: 72). This turns agent centred explanation 
around by suggesting that the entrepreneur not only happens to be ‘in the right place, at the right 
time’ to take advantage of a confluence of streams but is also reliant on the reputation and resources 
of their organization and the strength of their professional or political networks.   
 
The work on policy entrepreneurship by ODI, and the practice of many bodies like Crisis 
Group, is strongly indicative that ‘entrepreneurship’ is not simply the attribute of individuals but also 
characteristic of certain organizations (see also Mukhtarov and Gerlak, 2013). Think tanks are 
regarded as policy entrepreneur sine qua non (Stone, 2013). The European Union, the Commission 
or specific Directorates General, have been cast in this role (Braun, 2009; Herweg, 2015; Krause, 
2003). Likewise, the ILO leadership team has been portrayed as a policy entrepreneur with its agenda 
on ‘decent work’ (Di Ruggerio et al, 2015), or UNAIDS as a ‘policy transfer entrepreneur’ (Nay, 
2012).  Similarly, global environmental consultancy firms are identified as entrepreneurs for their 
agenda setting capacity in identifying environmental problems (Bouteligier, 2011). 
 
We can draw an analytical distinction between the individuals who are policy entrepreneurs 
and the process of policy entrepreneurship where policy entrepreneurs are generated by their 
professional and/or policy communities. It is necessary to ‘endogenize’ the policy entrepreneurs to a 
historical and institutional context (Bakir, 2009: 573) rather than representing them as standing above 
the policy fray.  While certain individuals may have superior skills (such as that of the story-teller), 
they are also inducted into such a role by their current professional or organisational context. This 
perspective on the policy entrepreneur argues that the organizational authors of policy ideas matter 
as much if not more than who happens to be the lead articulator. The organisation employing 
individual policy entrepreneurs is the force that broadcasts policy content while the wider 
organisational network generates or sustains the persistence of policy ideas or solutions.  
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ICG Entrepreneurship 
ICG’s success as an international policy entrepreneur has rested on three attributes: i) 
epistemic – a mix of individual expert authority and organizational skills as a think tank; ii) 
communication and connections – brokering ‘on the ground knowledge’ to international policy elites 
via the four RAPID styles identified earlier and iii) independence – its resource base and legal status 
as an autonomous expert advisory organization that nevertheless allows it to be accepted within 
international conflict resolution policy communities. For one critic these attributes point to a 
“problematic double nature as a producer of scientific knowledge and political actor” (Grigat, 2014: 
566). But for ICG, these mixed attributes provide the basic resources with which to navigate the 
turbulent streams of world politics and policy making, and then to take advantage of ‘windows of 
opportunity’ for the advancement of ICG research, analysis and recommendations – that is, to attach 
their ‘solutions’ to conflict problems. 
 
A particular challenge for ICG to couple with the politics stream is the multi-level 
governance venues across which it operates, the transnational policy communities it interacts with, 
and the frequent cross border nature of conflict. Accordingly, temporal considerations – the moment 
in time when a conflict sparks – do represent a ‘policy window’ for a body like ICG. Yet other 
‘windows’ are situated in the “multiple venues (such as political and administrative venues on 
different levels of government, scientific venues, or the media)” which provide prospects for “venue 
shopping”, or the scope to “manipulate the composition of venues so as to have their own coalition 
members represented, and to bypass those who resist change” (Huitema and Meijerink, 2010: 26). 
Accessing these multiple venues – which amplify the prospects for communication of information – 
provide some recourse to dampen the communication paradoxes outlined earlier. Yet, it also requires 
different types of policy entrepreneurship in conflict zones as opposed to policy entrepreneurship 
and long-term advocacy in UN and other multilateral negotiations. 
 
Extending the MS framework to the international domain has merited relatively little 
consideration (but see Alimi, 2015 and di Ruggeiro et al, 2015; Faling et al, 2018). Nevertheless, the 
framework can be conceptually stretched. In this scenario, ICG is part of an international policy 
community generating policy proposals from the policy stream. The politics stream is composed of 
international organisations and various governments connected to specific conflicts.  More so than is 
the case at national level of politics, the politics and policy streams overlap since many actors in 
international organisations are often involved in developing policy proposals. In the absence of 
global government, the ‘politics stream’ is far less populated with authoritative political institutions. 
Even so, the United Nations, the European Commission, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 
various regional bodies represent important institutional nodes in the politics stream.  
 
ICG transnational policy entrepreneurship 
Crisis Group has already been described as a “knowledge entrepreneur in the market of 
conflict/violence-related knowledge” (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2014a: 550). This image is cultivated 
not only through knowledge production but also knowledge brokerage. ICG tackles the 
communication paradoxes on multiple levels: Firstly, it reveals and broadcasts risks of conflict 
through monitoring and maintaining a long-term field presence in conflict areas. Secondly, ICG 
conducts field-based analysis and makes recommendations for policy relating to conflicts. Thirdly, 
the ICG offers, or claims to offer, objective analysis and details on conflicts. It is certainly an 
‘intelligence gathering’ organization (Gentry 2016).  Fourthly, it provides “new strategic thinking on 
some of the world's most intractable conflicts” such as Sudan/South Sudan and Arab-Israeli conflict. 
And lastly, it resurfaces attention on forgotten crises (which might also be thought of as ‘closed 
windows’) such as in Sri Lanka and Nagorno-Karabakh (ICG 2013).  In its publication on advocacy 
– Seizing the Moment (2016) – Crisis Group argues all of these tactics are necessary to take advantage 
of windows of opportunity and avert or mitigate looming conflicts and ease existing wars. 
 
ICG organizational ‘methodology’ is policy entrepreneurship.  The genesis of the ICG is 
distinguished by the abundance of professional staff with high level influence and their connections 
with experts in their field, in government and in international organizations. The Group’s “analysts 
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are drawn mostly from experienced former diplomats, journalists, academics and NGO staff” (ICG 
2012, 4). These individuals can be cast as ‘story tellers’ – especially the journalists – championing 
different armed conflicts with reports and bulletins and placing op-eds in Foreign Policy, the 
Washington Post, the New York Times for “consumption by a specific policy elite rather than by the 
broader public” (Simons, 2014: 593).  ICG’s 60-plus field operatives and analysts act as “the world’s 
eyes and ears for impending conflicts” at ground level and help engineer the ICGs policy 
prescriptions. Nevertheless, implementing measures to resolve or contain conflict are regarded 
strictly by ICG (interviews 1 and 2) as the preserve of local and national governments, and 
occasionally, peace keeping forces.  
 
While it may be a self-aggrandizing assertion, ICG web-site declares: “Much of Crisis 
Group’s most successful advocacy is done behind closed doors, requiring access to policymakers in 
major international centres” (Oberg, 2005). Alongside the field bases, the offices in Brussels, 
Washington and New York are necessary “to ensure Crisis Group has the access and influence at the 
highest levels of the U.S. and European governments, as well as with the UN, EU and NATO” (ICG, 
2015).  Accordingly, key networking roles in the Group are dominated by the ‘fixers’ and “played 
by senior staff highly experienced in government and by an active Board of Trustee comprising two 
former prime ministers, two former presidents, eight former foreign ministers, one former European 
Commissioner, one Nobel Peace Prize winner and many other leaders from the fields of politics, 
diplomacy, business and the media” (ICG 2013).   
 
It is not simply the status of members of the Board that matters, but also that many of these 
individuals transcended their national identities – the ‘flexian’ in policy flexian. As noted elsewhere, 
“institutional and policy innovation is more likely to occur when policy entrepreneurs with joint 
membership in domestic and international policy communities mediate various ideas and discourse 
within and among these communities” (Bakir, 2009: 593). This is evident in the composition of ICG 
leadership and their cross-cutting responsibilities in either other non-state actors or in official venues. 
For instance, Gareth Evans was co-Chair the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty that developed the R2P concept and at the time the concept dovetailed with ICG during 
his tenure, but not afterwards (interview 3 & Evans, 2017).  
 
In some respects, ICG organisational methodology is the ‘pet solution’ for crisis monitoring 
and prevention. The integrated chain of “knowledge production for peace” from field research 
through media communication, policy advocacy and political networking allows ICG staff to 
“perform overlapping roles that serve their own goals (as well as) of those with whom they associate” 
(Kostić, 2014: 637). Policy entrepreneurship becomes a recursive process interpolating individual, 
organisations and transnational networks.  
 
Recognised as a non-state actor that can act in a professional, non-confrontational style to 
mobilize political and policy actors, ICG has been adopted – or co-opted – as an ‘information tool’ 
for international institutions and governments to “extensively collect, analyze, and disseminate 
information pointedly aimed at globally important political targets – especially decision-makers of 
the states they want to perform or fund the actions they desire” (Gentry, 2016). Unlike the majority 
of advocacy NGOs throughout the world, Crisis Group has “mastered consumer-producer relations” 
of connecting analytic work through its networking with decision makers and connections to world 
publics through media contacts. This organizational methodology has allowed it to conquer some of 
the paradoxes – of complexity, altruism, ambition and wicked problems – outlined earlier. But not 
always – the limits of ICG policy entrepreneurship were met, for example, over the 2003 Iraq War – 
when a report “passionately arguing military action was misconceived” was pulled (Evans, 2017: 
203). More generally, ICG evidence and expertise can be ignored; communication can be cacophonic 
and networking competitive while independence from government precludes decision-making 
power. 
 
In terms of professional legitimacy, Crisis Group conforms to accepted practices (such as 
appropriate governance structures) and produces credible “knowledge production for peace”.  
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Accuracy in its analysis and media reporting is crucial (reported and repeated in all interviews). That 
is, “being absolutely obsessive about the quality of research, writing and presentation” (Evans, 2017: 
216). A policy entrepreneur organization acquires further agency when recognized as innovative and 
knowledgeable (Bouteligier, 2011). Participants in policy networks mutually enhance each other’s 
agency by fostering reputations. Indeed, ICG authority may be enhanced by fact that the title of 
‘entrepreneur’ or ‘diplomat’ is bestowed on them. The importance of recognition – such as official 
accreditation with OECD-DAC and the support from leading political figures – cannot be 
underestimated: a non-state actor like ICG, may have substantial knowledge and resources, but unless 
knowledge consumers in government and international organizations acknowledge this and make 
use of it, Crisis Group would be quite limited in its ability to shape agendas.   
 
Conclusion 
Bringing the Policy Studies concept of policy entrepreneur as an ‘insider’ or ‘near-
governmental’ actor within international policy communities distinguishes this type of actor from 
‘transnational alternative policy groups (Carroll 2015) and the ‘outsider’ strategies of norm advocacy 
by transnational networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). The paper has also sought to extend the MS 
framework so that Policy Studies might better grapple with global agenda dynamics. First it has 
drawn out the transnational dimensions of policy entrepreneurship taking it beyond the 
predominantly nation-state applications; this has been a limitation of the Multiple Streams approach.  
 
Second, the paper has highlighted the organizational basis for policy entrepreneurship.  
Organizations not only house, or serve as a platform for policy entrepreneurs, but also become 
entrepreneurs. Organisational resources – finances, communications departments, employees – are 
essential to maintain momentum behind policy pressures for change over the longue durée when 
individual policy entrepreneurs retire or depart for other positions. This overcomes the rampant 
methodological individualism of the approach.  
 
Third, rather than treating policy entrepreneurship as an inborn ‘talent’, the paper has 
disaggregated some entrepreneur styles that both individuals and organizations can learn and deploy. 
These ‘styles’, (developed originally by another ‘near-governmental’ organization – ODI), represent 
different strategies to make not only ‘evidence and analysis’ more influential in the ‘battle of ideas’ 
but also the organisations that articulate them. Nevertheless, Crisis Group’s ‘organizational 
methodology’ and transnational policy entrepreneurship to cultivate influence is limited by the eight 
communication paradoxes.  
 
This three-way re-articulation of the policy entrepreneur concept has relevance for 
understanding the agenda-setting strategies of non-state transnational actors inside international 
policy communities. Crisis Group is an excellent example of a well-connected transnational policy 
entrepreneur that is more ‘near-governmental’ than ‘non-governmental’. While the organizational 
dimension of policy entrepreneurs has been emphasized here, the role of individuals does remain 
important, particularly the “social acuity” (Mintrom and Norman, 2009) of ICG’s high level Board 
members who are often former politicians and diplomats.   
The ICG case also illuminates how the policy and policy streams overlap in international 
policy communities to a greater degree than was envisaged in the original MS formulation. This 
expert body, and others like it, navigate an ‘organised anarchy’; one where there is no world 
government to target advice and policy solutions but rather streams of policy, politics and problems 
running across multi-levels of governance.  
 
In generalising the approach developed here, numerous other bodies could be identified 
playing similar roles: For example, the idea of GPGs has been championed inside the UN system, 
the EU, World Bank and a number of international taskforces.  While these actors have done much 
to advance the ‘value acceptability’ of the GPG framework, the ‘technical feasibility’ issues of 
pooled financing, shared delivery of and supra-national authority over these goods remains highly 
indeterminate in a world order where state sovereignty prevails. The GPG paradigm of problem 
definition and policy change is also plagued by ‘communication paradoxes’ – given the arcane 
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economic theory it is founded upon. After having structured much policy discourse on international 
development during the first decade of the millennium, GPGs  have sunk back into the primeval 
soup. By contrast, the tangible and targeted objectives of bodies like the International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines (Wexler, 2003) and the Global Commission on Drugs (Alimi, 2015) are issue 
specific, have clear organizational goals and are better able to navigate the transnational problem and 
policy streams and orchestrate their confluence with the streams of national and international politics.   
 
 
 
 
Interviews  
 
Interview 1. Hugh Pope, Director of Communications, October 12, 2016, Avenue Louise, Brussels. 
 
Interview 2, Isabelle Arradon, Director of Research, October 12, 2016, Avenue Louise, Brussels. 
 
Interview 3. Gareth Evans, President Emeritus, International Crisis Group, June 21st 2017, 
Australian National University, Canberra. 
 
 
 
References 
 
Alimi, D. (2015) ‘Going Global: Policy Entrepreneurship of the Global Commission on Drugs’, 
Public Administration. 93(4), 874-889.  
Arieli, T., & Cohen, N. (2013). Policy entrepreneurs and post-conflict cross-border cooperation: a 
conceptual framework and the Israeli–Jordanian case. Policy Sciences, 46(3), 237-256. 
Bakir, C. (2009), Policy Entrepreneurship and Institutional Change: Multilevel Governance of 
Central Banking Reform. Governance, 22, 571–598.    
Beeson, M., and Stone, D. (2013). The changing fortunes of a policy entrepreneur: The case of Ross 
Garnaut. Australian Journal of Political Science, 48(1), 1-14. 
Blavoukos, S. and Bourantonis, D. (2011). Chairs as policy entrepreneurs in multilateral 
negotiations. Review of International Studies, 37(2), 653-672. 
Bliesemann de Guevara, B. (2014a). Studying the International Crisis Group. Third World Quarterly, 
35(4), 545-562.  
Bliesemann de Guevara, B. (2014b). On methodology and myths: exploring the International Crisis 
Group’s organisational culture. Third World Quarterly, 35(4), 616-633. 
 Bouteligier, S. (2011) ‘Exploring the agency of global environmental consultancy firms in earth 
system governance’, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and 
Economics, 11(1), 43-61. 
Braun, M. (2009)  ‘The evolution of emissions trading in the European Union – The role of policy 
networks, knowledge and policy entrepreneurs’, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34,  
469–487 
Carroll, William K. 2015. "Modes of Cognitive Praxis in Transnational Alternative Policy Groups." 
Globalizations 12(5), 710-27.  
Carter, R. G., and Scott, J. M. (2009). Choosing to lead: Understanding congressional foreign policy 
entrepreneurs. Duke University Press. 
Cohen, M. D., March, J. G., and Olsen, J. P. (1972) ‘A garbage can model of organizational choice’, 
Administrative Science Quarterly 17(1), 1-25.  
Desa, G. (2012) ‘Resource mobilization in international social entrepreneurship: Bricolage as a 
mechanism of institutional transformation. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 36(4), 
727-751. 
Di Ruggiero, E., Cohen, J., Cole, D., and Forman, L. (2015). Public Health Agenda Setting in a 
Global Context: The International Labor Organization’s Decent Work Agenda. American 
journal of public health, 105(4), e58-e61.  
14 
 
Duffield, L. (2007) Media and Global Conflict: An International Crisis Group Case Study 
[online]. Pacific Journalism Review, 13(2), 113-138.  
Evans, G. (2017) The Incorrigible Optimist: A Memoir, Melbourne University Press. 
Faling, M., Biesbroek, R., & Karlsson‐Vinkhuyzen, S. (2018). The Strategizing of Policy 
Entrepreneurs towards the Global Alliance for Climate‐Smart Agriculture. Global Policy.  
Gentry, J. (2016) Toward a Theory of Non-State Actors' Intelligence, Intelligence and National 
Security, 31(4), 465-89. 
Grigat, S. (2014) ‘Educating into Liberal Peace: the International Crisis Group’s contribution to an 
emerging global governmentality’ Third World Quarterly, 35(4), 563-580  
Henriksen, L. F., & Seabrooke, L. (2016). ‘Transnational organizing: Issue professionals in 
environmental sustainability networks’. Organization, 23(5), 722-741. 
Herweg, N. (2015) ‘Explaining European agenda-setting using the multiple streams framework: the 
case of European natural gas regulation’. Policy Sciences, 1-21. 
Huitema, D. and Meijerink, S. (2010) ‘Realizing water transitions: the role of policy entrepreneurs 
in water policy change’, Ecology and Society 15(2), 26.  
ICG (2016) Seizing the moment: From Early Warning to Early Action, Brussels: International Crisis 
Group.  
ICG (2015). About Crisis Group. International Crisis Group Available at: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/about.aspx [Last Accessed: 21/10/15] 
ICG (2013). About Crisis Group. International Crisis Group, Available at: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/about.aspx [Last Accessed: 11/09/13] 
ICG (2010) Fifteen Years on the Front Lines 1995-2010. Brussels: International Crisis Group. 
ICG (2012) Annual Report 2013. 2012 Review, Plans for 2013. International Crisis Group. 
Jones, M. D., Peterson, H. L., Pierce, J. J., Herweg, N., Bernal, A., Lamberta Raney, H. and 
Zahariadis, N. (2016), ‘A River Runs Through It: A Multiple Streams Meta-Review’, Policy 
Studies Journal. 44(1), 13-36  
Joachim, Jutta. (2003) ‘Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs and Women's 
Rights’, International Studies Quarterly 47(2):247-74. 
Keck, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders: Transnational activist networks in 
international politics. Itaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Kingdon, J. W. (1995) Agendas, alternatives, and public policies, NY: Harper Collins. Second 
edition, New York: Longman.  
Kostic, R. (2014) ‘Transnational think-tanks: foot soldiers in the battlefield of ideas? The role of the 
ICG in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2000–01’, Third World Quarterly, 35(4), 634-651. 
Krause, A. (2003). The European Union’s Africa policy: the Commission as policy entrepreneur in 
the CFSP. European foreign affairs review, 8(2), 221-237. 
Maxwell, S. (2009) Presentation to the Informal Network of DAC Meeting, Dublin, 
http://www.simonmaxwell.eu/images/stories/ppts/dublin%20sm%20new.pdf [Accessed: 
17/10/2017] 
Mintrom, M. and Norman, P. (2009) ‘Policy Entrepreneurship and Policy Change’, Policy Studies 
Journal 37, 649-667. 
Mukhtarov, F. and Gerlak, A. (2013) ‘River basin organizations in the global water discourse: An 
exploration of agency and strategy’, Global Governance, 19(2), 307-326.  
Oberg, Jan (2005) International Crisis Group: Who Pays the Piper? The Transnational Foundation 
for Peace and Future Research, April 15th: http://www.hartford-
hwp.com/archives/27a/201.html 
Oborn, E., Barrett, M. and Exworthy, M. (2011), ‘Policy entrepreneurship in the Development of 
Public Sector Strategy: The Case of London Health Reform’, Public Administration, 
89, 325–344.  
Nay, O. (2012). How do policy ideas spread among international administrations? Policy 
entrepreneurs and bureaucratic influence in the UN response to AIDS. Journal of Public 
Policy, 32(01), 53-76. 
Pralle, S.  (2009) ‘Agenda-setting and climate change’, Environmental Politics, 18,5, 781-799 
Rosen, F., & Olsson, P. (2013). ‘Institutional entrepreneurs, global networks, and the emergence of 
international institutions for ecosystem-based management’, Marine Policy, 38, 195-204.  
15 
 
Sending, Ole Jacob (2019) Knowledge Networks, Scientific Communities, and Evidence-Informed 
Policy, in K Moloney (Eds) The Oxford Handbook of Global Policy and Transnational 
Administration, Oxford, Oxford University Press.  
Simons, G. (2014) ‘The International Crisis Group and the manufacturing and communicating of 
crises’, Third World Quarterly, 35(4), 581-597 
Smith, Jackie. 1999. "Global Politics and Transnational Social Movement Strategies: The 
Transnational Campaign against Trade in Toxic Wastes." In H. Kriesi, D. D. Porta and D. 
Rucht. (Eds) Social Movements in a Globalizing World, London, MacMillan, 170-88 
Stone, D. (2013) Knowledge actors and transnational governance: The private-public policy nexus 
in the global agora. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Stubbs, Paul. (2013) ‘Flex Actors and Philanthropy in (Post-) Conflict Arenas: Soros’ Open Society 
Foundations in the Post-Yugoslav Space’, Croatian Political Science Review, 50(5): 114-
138.   
Shwed, U., & Bearman, P. S. (2010). The temporal structure of scientific consensus formation. 
American sociological review, 75(6), 817-840.  
Thakur, R., & Weiss, T. G. (2009) ‘R2P: From Idea to Norm—and Action?’ Global Responsibility 
to Protect, 1(1), 22-53.  
Wexler, L. (2003) ‘International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses, and Norm 
Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine Ban Treaty’, The 
Arizona Journal of international and Comparative Law, 20, 561. 
Wong. Wendy (2012) Internal Affairs: How the Structure of Ngos Transforms Human Rights. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press  
Zhu, X. (2008) ‘Strategy of Chinese policy entrepreneurs in the third sector: challenges of “Technical 
Infeasibility”. Policy Sciences, 41(4), 315-334. 
Zhu, Y. (2013). Policy Entrepreneurship, Institutional Constraints, and Local Policy Innovation in 
China. China Review, 13(2), 97-122. 
 
